Transition to Basel II: Policy Lessons of the Chilean Experience by Enrique Marshall
DOCUMENTOS DE POLÍTICA ECONÓMICA
BANCO CENTRAL DE CHILE
Transition to Basel II:
Policy Lessons of the Chilean Experience
Enrique Marshall
N.° 21 - November 2007
ECONOMIC POLICY PAPERS
CENTRAL BANK OF CHILEBANCO CENTRAL DE CHILE
CENTRAL BANK OF CHILE
La Serie de Documentos de Política Económica, del Banco Central de Chile, divulga el
pensamiento de las autoridades de la institución sobre la economía chilena y la conducción de
la política monetaria. Esta Serie es una instancia de difusión y discusión de tópicos relevantes
para los objetivos y el accionar del Banco Central,  dirigida a un público más amplio que el de
los especialistas.
The Series of Economic Policy Papers of the Central Bank of Chile presents views and analyses
of the Chilean economy and the conduct of monetary policy prepared by Bank authorities. This
series, aimed at the general public, disseminates and discusses topics that are relevant to the
goals and operations of the Central Bank.
Documentos de Política Económica del Banco Central de Chile
Economic Policy Papers of the Central Bank of Chile
ISSN 0717 - 7151
Agustinas 1180 - Santiago, Chile
Teléfono: (56-2) 6702475; Fax: (56-2) 6702231 
TRANSITION TO BASEL II: 













This document presents an overview of the Chilean banking system and the steps taken so far in 
its transition to Basel II.  The balance of the process so far is positive reflecting reforms over the 
last two decades that paved the road for a smooth transition to the new capital framework.   
However, the complexity of Basel II calls for special attention to the way in which it is 
implemented.  The analysis of Chile’s experience to date is, therefore, an interesting exercise, 
offering policy lessons that may be a valuable input for other countries considering adoption or 








    
 
Chile has yet to complete its transition to Basel II but, almost four years after 
announcing its decision to adopt the new capital framework in January 2004, a 
significant number of measures have been taken by both the country’s supervisors and 
its banks and they have acquired valuable experience in the process.  As a result, it is 
interesting to assess progress so far and to examine preliminary policy lessons, some of 




I. The Chilean banking system
1  
 
The Chilean banking system is small by any standard.  The number of institutions does 
not surpass thirty, and those considered full banks account for no more than half of that 
figure while the remainder are small specialized institutions or branches of international 
banks.  Moreover, although the system’s total assets as a ratio to GDP, at more than 
90%, are relatively large compared to other developing countries, they reach only 150 
billion dollars.  
 
The severe crisis suffered by Chile’s banking industry in the early 1980’s, which put 
most institutions into technical bankruptcy, is now past history.  Today, the system is on 
a completely different footing and appears fundamentally sound.  Its capital ratios have 
remained well above the legal minimum as well as above market standards, although 
they have recently seen a slight drop as activity has expanded strongly.  At present, the 
industry has an average Basel Index around 12.5% and no institution is below 10%.  
Over the last decade, its past-due ratio has remained within the 1-2% range and has now 
dropped to just below 1% in a cyclical movement that reflects a favorable economic 
environment.  Provisions have followed a similar pattern but, for prudential reasons, 
have remained above 1%.  
 
Profitability has also remained high and stable over time, with return on equity running 
at between 9% and 22% and averaging around 16% over the last 15 years. This 
performance, which is an additional source of strength for the industry, compares 
favorably with that of other countries.
2 In addition, the general view is that the industry 
enjoys high professional management standards.  
 
Regulation and supervision have gradually been strengthened.  The current framework 
is based to a large extent on modern concepts of prudential regulation and risk-based 
supervision.  An external assessment of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision (BCP), conducted under a Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) in 
2004, found a level of compliance similar to that observed in developed countries, 
suggesting that the system is prepared to adopt new international standards and 
recommendations, including the new capital framework. 
                                                 
1 A summary of data on the Chilean banking system is presented in the Annex. 
2 For figures on return on equity in the banking industry for a list of different countries, see the 
“Statistical Appendix” of the IMF’s “Global Financial Stability Report”. 
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Market discipline has also increased.  In this area, the creation of a private pension fund 
system in the early 1980’s played a decisive role, not only by contributing to the 
development of the domestic capital market, which was previously of insignificant size, 
but also because it meant improvements in financial disclosure and transparency.  It also 
favored the development of a private ratings industry which has acquired important 
experience during the past 20 years and has developed formal links with global rating 
agencies. 
 
Foreign banks have a significant presence in both corporate and retail activities, with a 
total market share of around 40%, and have made a significant contribution to banking 
development, particularly in promoting financial innovation and corporate governance 
standards.  Domestic privately-owned banks represent 50% of the market and the only 
state-owned bank, BancoEstado, accounts for the remaining 10%. 
 
Bank exposure is mostly domestic. Despite their ready access to international markets, 
neither domestic nor foreign banks in Chile have shown significant cross-border 
expansion.  In addition, lending is conducted mainly in local currency, with foreign-
currency funds used to finance exporters or other clients with foreign-currency 
revenues.  The ratio of foreign-currency loans to total loans has remained at around 15% 
with no major changes over time and foreign-currency funding is available from 
different sources so banks are well able to match their exposures. 
 
The presence of mixed-activity financial conglomerates in the banking industry has 
historically been significant.  Currently, ten of the 26 banks operating in Chile, 
representing close to 50% of the loan market, are part of such conglomerates.  This 
figure will be substantially reduced if two recently-announced mergers are completed in 
the coming months.
3  Although they are not subject to fully-consolidated supervision - 
something that would be extremely difficult to implement given their complexity - these 
conglomerates are subject to strict regulation to avoid undesirable practices, such as 
self-lending and, as a general principle, have to run their banking business separate from 
the rest of their activities to prevent any contagion. 
 
In the past, lack of competition was perceived as a problem but, although competition 
remains limited in some segments of the retail market, the situation has improved as 
new players have entered the market.  Spreads have become quite competitive in 
corporate banking but continue to be relatively high in retail banking where efficiency 
still needs to improve.  For this reason, the use of new technologies, like ATMs
4, debit 
cards, electronic banking and sophisticated credit-risk analysis based on good credit 
reporting, need to be fostered further in order to bring down production and transaction 
costs and risk premiums and, as a consequence, credit spreads. 
 
                                                 
3  The two mergers referred to are that between Banco de Chile and Citibank Chile and that between 
Scotiabank and Banco del Desarrollo. 
4 ATM is an acronym for automated teller machine. 
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Banking penetration is relatively high compared to other developing countries and 
access to bank services and finance is quite widespread.  However, it still needs to 
expand in the segment of small and medium-sized enterprises and among individuals, 
groups of which a significant proportion continue to be under-bankarized or not 
bankarized at all.   
 
All these positive factors are widely recognized by market analysts and credit rating 
agencies.  Chilean banks, for instance, hold investment-grade ratings in local and 
foreign currency and some leading institutions have the same rating as the country - that 
is, single A.  A similar positive view is reflected in a report issued by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) on banking strength across countries where the Chilean system 
ranked in first place among emerging economies. 
 
Nonetheless, Chile still faces a number of challenges.  As well as the expansion of 
banking and financial services to new segments of the population, these include 
progress towards consolidated supervision, the fostering of greater competition, the 
establishment of accounting rules in line with international standards, and a successful 
transition to Basel II. 
 
 
II. Preparing the transition 
 
In Chile, preparation for the transition to Basel II has coincided with a process of 
integral improvement of regulation, supervision and risk management that dates back to 
the banking crisis of the 1980’s.  In the wake of this experience, the foundations of 
prudential regulation and supervision were gradually laid.  
 
This process included a number of far-reaching reforms implemented in recent years.  
These were necessary and beneficial in their own right but had the added advantage of 
paving the road for Chile’s adoption of the new capital framework.  In addition, 
measures more specifically geared to the transition to Basel II have also been 
implemented of which the most significant include: 
 
1)  Risk-based supervisory model 
  
In 2001, Chile’s bank supervisor, the Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones 
Financieras (SBIF), adopted a full risk-based supervisory model, definitively 
abandoning its traditional rules-based model.
5  In line with this new focus on risk 
management, the three main banking risks (credit, market and operational risks) were 
separately identified as relevant for a bank’s performance.   
 
Under the new model, banks are evaluated periodically and receive a supervisory rating 
which is not disclosed to the public.  When weaknesses are detected, corrective 
                                                 
5 For further details, see Article V of the General Banking Act and Chapters 1-13 of “Recopilación 
Actualizada de Normas” by the SBIF (both documents available on the SBIF’s website, www.sbif.cl). 
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measures are recommended, the direct involvement of the board of directors is required, 
and progress is closely monitored by the supervisor.   
 
In 2005, this model was updated and revised principally with the aim of providing a 
more precise identification and definition of the elements that would be subject to 
supervisory assessment. Subsequently, the management of capital was included as one 
of the key factors to be evaluated. 
 
2)   Update of loan classification and provisioning system  
 
In 2004, Chile’s loan classification and provisioning system was updated and improved 
in order to serve as an effective tool for managing expected risks and losses.
6  The main 
drawback of the previous system was its excessive reliance on supervisory assessment 
of individual credit exposures and risks.  
 
The new system, which is consistent with Basel II definitions, obliges banking 
institutions to take much more responsibility while, at the same time, allowing them 
greater flexibility in the use of internal models based on credit-risk concepts.   
 
Under this new system, a bank’s board of directors is required to make a formal 
pronouncement, at least once a year, on the adequacy of its provisions, thereby shifting 
the focus of supervision to credit-risk management and away from individual credit 
ratings.  Banks are now using the new guidelines to report the credit-risk profile of their 




3)  Convergence of local accounting rules with international standards 
  
The banking system has led the way in the Chilean corporate and financial sector as 
regards to the process of convergence of local accounting rules to International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), which was launched in 2004. This medium-term 
project is considered essential for enhancing financial disclosure, transparency and, as a 
consequence, market discipline. An important step was taken in 2005 when fair-value 
accounting was introduced for financial investments and derivatives.
8  According to the 
time-table announced by the SBIF, full implementation of the new standards is expected 
for 2009. 
 
4)  Assessment of the external ratings industry 
 
In principle, Chile’s external ratings industry appears prepared to support 
implementation of the standardized approach to credit risk.  It is a relatively mature 
                                                 
6 For further details, see Chapters 7-10 of “Recopilación Actualizada de Normas” by the SBIF (available 
on the SBIF’s website, www.sbif.cl). 
7 As part of the process of adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards in the banking sector 
some adjustments to the loan classification and provisioning system are expected in the coming months. 
8 For further details, see Chapters 7-12 of “Recopilación Actualizada de Normas” and Circular Nº 3.300 
by the SBIF, January 5, 2005 (both documents available on the SBIF’s website, www.sbif.cl). 
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industry that has accumulated important experience over the past 20 years and provides 
reasonable coverage of the corporate sector.  
 
The main drawback in this area is that the scale used to assign local ratings is not fully 
consistent with that used for global ratings, and this poses questions that need to be 
addressed if the standardized approach is to be implemented.
9
 
5)  Quantitative impact studies and stress-testing exercises 
 
Quantitative studies of the impact of the new accord have been carried out for the 
banking system as a whole, based on the guidelines of the standardized approach.
10  
These show that Basel II would not have a major impact on capital requirements and, 
using strict Basel II criteria, the exercise, in fact, indicates a slight reduction in capital 
requirements for the system as a whole, although the impact is not uniform across 
banks. 
  
Stress-testing exercises have also been conducted to simulate the potential effects of 
significant macroeconomic shocks - including major devaluations or revaluations, 
drastic changes in interest rates and a serious deterioration of credit quality - on the 
profitability and solvency of the banking system as a whole.
11  The results indicate that 
these macro shocks would have an impact on profitability as measured by return on 
equity, but only a limited impact on solvency as measured by the Basel I Capital Index.  
According to a study by the Central Bank of Chile, using three different stress 
scenarios, the system’s average Basel I Index would fall only marginally and no bank 
would drop below the 8% regulatory requirement.
12
 
6)  Assessment of Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP) 
 
In 2004, an external evaluation of these principles was carried out by a joint IMF-World 
Bank mission under an FSAP program.  It revealed an 83% level of compliance, which 
is comparable with the average level found in developed countries.  The evaluation 
identified weaknesses in areas such as capital allocation for market risk, prevention of 
money laundering, legal protection for banking supervisors and consolidated 
                                                 
9 For further details, see Günther Held, Adriana Emhart, Magali Giudice and Luis Raúl Romero, 
“Calificaciones de riesgo, ponderadores de riesgo y requisitos de capital”, 2006, (available on the SBIF’s 
website, www.sbif.cl).  
10 For a summary of the results of the last available quantitative impact study (QIS 5), see “Developments 
and Remaining Challenges Related to Basel II Implementation”, presentation by Gustavo Arriagada, 
Superintendent of Banks at the ASBA/FSI Meeting, Miami, April 25-26, 2006 (available on the SBIF’s 
website, www.sbif.cl). 
11 See Carlos Budnevich Le-Fort and Sergio Huerta Vial, “Ejercicios de Tensión del Capital en la Banca 
Chilena”,  May 2006 (available on the SBIF’s website, www.sbif.cl).  
12 See “Informe de Estabilidad Financiera, Primer Semestre 2007” Central Bank of Chile (available on the 
Central Bank’s website, www.bcentral.cl). 
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supervision.
13  Since the results of the assessment were released, significant progress 
has been made in most of these areas.
14
 
7)  Allocation of capital for market risk 
 
In 2005, the Central Bank of Chile established new regulation that is very much in line 
with the Market Risk Amendment (1997)
15 under which banks were required to manage 
their risks using the so-called standardized approach and were subsequently offered the 
possibility of moving to the internal model approach, subject to prior approval from the 
supervisor.
16  Although the legal definition of the minimum capital requirement did not 
change, in practice this meant the incorporation of capital charges for market risks.  
 
8)  Plan for the transition to Basel II 
 
In early 2005, the SBIF and the Central Bank presented a plan for the transition to Basel 
II, which is currently being implemented according to schedule.
17  This plan establishes 
a number of guiding principles for the transition process: 
 
a)  It will be conducted jointly by the SBIF, which is responsible for supervision, 
and the Central Bank, which monitors financial stability; 
 
b)  The transition will be gradual and stepwise. In the first stage, only the 
standardized approach to credit and operational risk will be adopted and the 
option of adopting advanced models will be offered only in the second stage; 
 
c)  Close communication and coordination with the industry will be maintained 
throughout the transition process; 
 
d)  Full collaboration will be extended to relevant foreign supervisors and support 
will be provided for international groups with subsidiaries or branches in Chile 
                                                 
13 See “Compliance with the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision”, which 
summarizes the assessment conducted by the IMF/World Bank (available on the SBIF’s website, 
www.sbif.cl).    
14 Law N° 20,190, published on 06/05/07 (also known as the “Second Capital Market Reform”), 
addressed the issue of legal protection for banking supervisors.  In addition, it gave the SBIF powers to 
require information from bank subsidiaries involved in non-banking businesses in order to strengthen 
consolidated supervision at the level of the bank holding.  Several material improvements have also been 
made in the field of the prevention of  money laundering, including additional powers for the Financial 
Analysis Unit (UAF), which started operations in 2004 and is now fully operative.  Finally, bullet number 
7 of this section covers the issue of market risk and its incorporation for capital allocation requirements.  
15 The original title of the document published by the BIS is “Amendment to the capital accord to 
incorporate market risks” but it is commonly referred to as the “Market Risk Amendment”. It was 
originally released in January 1996, modified in September 1997, and further revised on November 14, 
2005.   
16 For further details, see Chapter III.B.2, “Compendio de Normas Financieras” (available on the Central 
Bank’s website, www.bcentral.cl). 
17 See “Road Map Guidelines: Transition to Basel II” consultative document, January 2005, and “Hoja de 
Ruta Hacia Basilea II, 2007-08” November, 2006 (both documents available on the SBIF’s website, 
www.sbif.cl). 
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so they can implement Basel II at the level of their parent company according to 
the criteria set by the home country supervisor.  However, all banks operating in 
Chile’s jurisdiction, whether local or foreign, will be subject to the decisions and 
recommendations contained in the transition plan. 
 
 
III. Policy Lessons 
 
Although it is still somewhat premature for a complete assessment of Chile’s transition 
process to Basel II, some preliminary policy lessons can already be identified.   
 
Basel II acceptance 
 
Although there are, of course, still issues that cause concern and need to be clarified or 
resolved, the view that the new capital framework represents a major step forward for 
regulation, supervision and risk management has gained ground in most developing 
countries and is now widely accepted.  
 
There is no doubt that Basel II is absolutely necessary for internationally active banks 
since it allows for more risk-sensitive capital allocations and provides a level playing 
field for those competing globally or, at least, in different markets.  Moreover, given the 
ever-increasing complexity and sophistication of financial products and services, there 
is little doubt that the new capital framework is important for large institutions, 
regardless of whether they target domestic or global markets.  
 
Concerns arise, however, when considering implementation among small and medium-
sized banks, particularly in developing countries.  In spite of this, Basel II will have a 
positive impact even in jurisdictions where adoption is not a straightforward decision 
because it provides a new framework for dealing with regulation, supervision, risk 
management, corporate governance and market discipline and, regardless of the 
technicalities of calculating capital requirements, is designed to promote advances in all 
these areas, thereby strengthening financial stability. 
 
Prior assessment of regulation and supervision 
 
Basel II requires strong regulatory and supervisory foundations.   As a result, prior to 
implementation, it is necessary to establish an accurate diagnosis of the current state of 
regulation, supervision and bank management. 
 
Most of these issues are referred to in the BCP. A formal assessment of BCP 
compliance, therefore, is useful in identifying areas that will require improvement or 
reinforcement during the transition.  A review under an FSAP is a sensible option since 
it has the advantage of using a proven and standard methodology.  In Chile, the 
assessment made by an IMF/World Bank mission in 2004 was very useful and, as 
mentioned above, led to initiatives to address most of the weaknesses that were 
identified. 
  9   
 
Basel I compliance first 
 
Basel II has been proposed as a more risk-sensitive and efficient capital framework.  It 
is not intended to increase capital requirements but to improve standards of risk 
management and supervision within the banking sector.  However, moving to Basel II 
will be difficult and will not receive the necessary industry support if it is associated 
with a significant increase in capital requirements.   
 
As Basel II is a far more complex framework, serious shortcomings in the 
implementation of the previous framework need to be resolved first.  Recurrent issues in 
developing countries include under-estimation of risks, over-valuation of risk mitigation 
factors and under-provisioning and over-valuation of capital.  As a result, capital 
adequacy is usually far from appropriate, even in cases where formal requirements are 
met.  
  
In Chile, a serious weakness in Basel I implementation was the lack of capital charges 
for market risks.  This was resolved in 2005 when the Central Bank replaced existing 
rules for market risks based on limits for asset and liability mismatches with new 
regulation based on risk assessment and capital allocation. 
 
Reinforcing provisioning standards 
 
The proper management of provisions is essential for implementing the new capital 
framework.  This is particularly so in developing countries where cyclical economic 
fluctuations have historically tended to be larger.  In periods of severe economic and 
financial stress, a bank’s capital may turn out to be insufficient and difficult to restore.  
In these circumstances, provisions will provide an additional source of strength, 
particularly when they are calculated to cover expected losses over the cycle.   
Moreover, it can be argued that a well-designed provisioning system may partially 
offset the pro-cyclical effects of capital requirements.  Provisions are related to expected 
risks and losses and can, therefore, be assessed using the same analytical framework 
proposed by the new capital framework.  This means that the enhancement of 




Small retail-oriented institutions, micro-finance entities and cooperative banks have a 
significant presence in most developing countries. Their main comparative advantage 
vis-à-vis large institutions is their knowledge of clients with whom they tend to have 
close relations and this usually offsets their disadvantage as regards raising capital.  In 
general, they have come under Basel I but the question now is whether they should 
move to Basel II.   
 
For these banks, the complexity and cost of implementation may well outweigh the 
potential benefits. As a result, there is widespread agreement that an excessive burden 
should not be placed on these institutions.  If the policy decision is that they should also 
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move to Basel II, a simplified version of the standardized approach would probably be 







Implications for the domestic and international competitiveness of banks need to be 
permanently assessed.  In order to maintain a level playing field, comparable banks 
should receive comparable treatment, which is easy to say but more difficult to put into 
practice.  Excessive emphasis on equal or similar treatment of all banks within a country 
could put some at a disadvantage internationally while, on the other hand, there is a risk 
that too great a differentiation could create competitive inequalities in the domestic 
market.  
 
The increasing integration of financial markets also means that the new capital 
framework may have competitive implications beyond the banking industry.  The 
distinction between different types of financial entities is no longer as clear as in the 
past since a range of non-banking financial institutions now undertake activities such as 
consumer lending, mortgage generation and credit card issuance that were previously 
carried out exclusively by banks.  The implementation of Basel II will again raise the 
issue of regulating activities instead of institutions, which has important competitive 
implications in financial markets.  
 
Corporate governance standards  
 
New regulatory trends require high corporate governance standards.  To promote 
efficiency and innovation, policymakers and regulators are giving banks more flexibility 
to set policies and manage risks. The practical implication of this new approach is that 
their corporate structure needs to be improved in areas that include the functioning of 
the board of directors, the role of top managers and internal controls.  These concepts 
are well embedded in Basel II, which allows banks to use their own internal models, but 
simultaneously demands a strong internal process for assessing capital adequacy.  For 
this reason, the improvement of corporate governance standards and the promotion of 
good practices and self-regulation are essential for implementing the new capital 
framework and, particularly, Pillars II and III.  This has been a priority in Chile where 
supervision currently attaches great importance to the functioning of the board of 
directors, including that of the audit committee, mainly in connection with risk 
management. 
 
The role of market discipline 
 
Market discipline plays a key role in supporting regulation and supervision.  As a result, 
it is increasingly seen as a necessary condition for maintaining the safety and soundness 
of the financial system.  Given the current trend towards increased flexibility in risk 
management, the importance of market discipline is even greater and this is particularly 
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so for the implementation of the more advanced approaches of Basel II.  Greater 
flexibility in managing capital adequacy means an increased need for some form of 
market as well as supervisory validation.  For market discipline to work, financial 
disclosure and transparency standards need to be enhanced and, in this context, an early 
priority should be to bring accounting rules as closely as possible into line with 




In most developing countries, Basel I was not implemented immediately and in Chile, 
for example, did not come into force until almost ten years after the original document 
was released.  Similarly, the implementation of Basel II will necessarily require a long 
time as well as hard work.  The preparation and discussion of the final Basel II 
document took several years and there is no reason to expect that implementation will 
take significantly less time.   
 
Taking this into account, realism and pragmatism must prevail when setting transition 
plans and timetables.  For most emerging economies, the correct strategy will be to 
move gradually and step-by-step.  This means implementing first the standardized 
approach and considering the possibility of moving to the advanced approaches only 
once knowledge and experience have been acquired.   The standardized approach may 
be perceived as excessively simple for the complexities of banking activities in 
developed countries but offers advantages for developing countries where banking 
activities are, in most cases, still rather simple and credit exposures are mainly 
domestic.  In these circumstances, it may prove to be the best option after costs and 




The use of external ratings, considered under the standardized approach, raises some 
concerns, most importantly because they are neither widely available in developing 
countries nor is their quality well-established. As a result, their use under the 
standardized approach may not be recommendable.   
 
In addition, even where their coverage and quality seems reasonable, the scale used 
locally may not be fully consistent with international scales, meaning that while they 
may be useful for domestic comparisons, this is not the case for cross-country analysis.  
Differences in scales are related to local versus foreign-currency denominations as well 
as to the ceiling for cross-border transactions imposed by the sovereign rating.  This 
problem is more serious and more difficult to resolve in countries below investment 
grade where deviations between local and international ratings are significant.  In any 
case, under the standardized approach, supervisors will need to provide guidelines for 
the use of local external ratings and, in this task, the involvement of the ratings industry 
will be required.   
 
It is important to note that these problems with external ratings in no way prevent the 
implementation of the standardized approach since it considers the option of using a 
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common risk weight of 100% for all corporate exposures.  When external ratings do not 
provide adequate coverage of corporate risks or are not reliable enough, the best policy 
decision is not necessarily to jump immediately to the advanced approaches, but to 
build or strengthen the banking industry’s capacity to assess credit risks.  The lack of a 
reliable ratings industry could indicate a gap in risk assessment that needs to be filled 
before relying on internal ratings. 
 
Practical use of capital indexes  
 
A key concept under Basel I has been the so-called Basel Index, which is the ratio of 
capital to risk-weighted assets.  This simple and easy-to-measure index is extensively 
used at the board and management level and for external assessment by market analysts 
and ratings agencies as well as by regulators and supervisors.  In banking and securities 
markets, we find an increasing number of rules that refer to the Basel Index and, in 
Latin America, several countries have set minimum capital ratios well above 8% for 
macro-prudential reasons.   
 
These indexes lose importance under the new capital framework as they become much 
more difficult to calculate and interpret.  Moreover, their use by regulators and 
supervisors may turn to be meaningless and, therefore, ineffective.  The challenge for 
policymakers and supervisors is to find a new simple measure, possibly a revised 
version of the Basel Index, by which to set rules and benchmarks.  
 
Home/host communications and cooperation  
 
One of the key challenges of Basel II is to establish effective mechanisms for 
cooperation and communication between the supervisors of different countries, a field 
in which most have little experience.  Although the sharing of information related to 
money laundering and licensing has helped in recent years, there is only limited 
experience of sharing responsibility for the supervision of a common standard, such as 
the new capital framework.   
 
One of the most sensitive areas for collaboration between home and host supervisors are 
the subsidiaries or branches of foreign banks since, at least during the transition period, 
these and the parent company could well find themselves operating under different 
capital regimes.  As foreign banks have an increasing presence in most developing 
countries, it would seem advisable to focus on those institutions with a significant or 
systemic importance, otherwise the burden and cost of establishing communication and 
a cooperation framework with all foreign supervisors may prove too onerous.   
 
Involvement of banks and bankers 
 
Although supervisors continue to have a vital role, the implementation of Basel II is 
mainly the responsibility of banks and bankers, and they must play an active role in the 
transition.  As long as supervisors are the only party committed to this project, progress 
will be limited and they should, therefore, motivate banks to assume their respective 
tasks.  Seminars and conferences can be useful tools but, perhaps, the most effective 
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course of action is to establish a working group in which both the industry and 
supervisors can analyze issues of mutual interest and, in general, monitor the 
transition’s progress.   In Chile, such a group, bringing together supervisors and bank 
practitioners, was set up and is currently functioning, and has proved a very useful 
vehicle for industry involvement. 
 
Coordination with the Central Bank  
 
In some jurisdictions, bank supervision is the responsibility of an agency different from 
the Central Bank, raising the issue of communication and coordination between the two 
institutions.  In such cases, although the Central Bank is not involved in supervising 
individual institutions, it usually has some responsibility for monitoring financial 
stability from a macro or systemic standpoint and, in any case, the relationship between 
Basel II and the safety and soundness of the banking system as a whole is evident.   
 
Additionally, although the Central Bank is not involved in supervision, it usually has 
regulatory powers in areas that are directly or indirectly related to Basel II and those 
powers will have to be exercised during the implementation phase.  From a practical 
point of view, it is also important to establish a common position before starting the 
transition and, particularly, before proposing legal amendments.  In this context, 
collaboration between supervisors and central bankers will make a positive contribution 
to the success of the implementation of the new capital framework.   
 
In Chile, communication and coordination have existed from the beginning of this 
process and, in 2005, when the transition plan was launched, this was done so jointly by 
the SBIF and the Central Bank.  Subsequently, close communication has been 
maintained, mainly as regards monitoring the impact on financial stability, and was 
facilitated because the Central Bank is a member of the coordination committee made 




In some jurisdictions, the implementation of Basel II will require legal changes.  Capital 
requirements are a sensitive matter and have traditionally been set by law.  However, 
considering the complexity of the new capital accord, it is advisable to gain familiarity 
with its terms and to interact with the industry in order to gather information, 
knowledge and experience before proposing and passing specific legal amendments.  It 
is also important to remember that such amendments usually take time and remain in 
place for a period of several years so it will be necessary to determine precisely those 
points to be established by law and those rules that will be set by the banking supervisor 
and/or the Central Bank.  
 
This is particularly important given the enormous amount of details and technicalities 
that the new capital accord involves and the constant changes and innovations that take 
place in financial markets.  It is worth noting that, in Chile, the SBIF has already begun 
  14   
paving the road for the implementation of Basel II by making use of legal powers that 
allow it to promote good management practices.
18
 
Building supervisory capacities 
 
The detail and technicality of Basel II also mean that its implementation poses complex 
challenges for banking supervisors.  As a result, before drawing up a working program 
for the transition, they would be well advised to create a specialized unit, formed by 
highly-qualified professionals, to assimilate the contents and scope of the new 
framework.  If the necessary qualifications and skills do not exist internally, they should 
be provided through training or external recruitment.   
 
The second and, perhaps, most important step is to transfer responsibility for the project 
to those in charge of field supervision so they can start to incorporate the new ideas and 
concepts into their day-to-day work. This is a major challenge as it will most certainly 
imply the adaptation of supervisory methods and procedures, massive training of 
personnel and cultural changes. 
 
 
IV. Final remarks 
 
A few months after the final Basel II document was released, Chile’s financial 
authorities announced the country’s transition to the new framework for which the 
Chilean banking industry was considered prepared.  After undergoing several structural 
reforms in the last two decades, the industry appears today fundamentally sound while 
regulation, supervision and bank management have to a great extent moved into line 
with international standards and practices. At the same time, the banking sector is well 
integrated into international markets and its level of activity relative to the size of the 
economy is high as compared to other developing countries.   
 
All of this is recognized by market analysts and credit rating agencies that rank the 
Chilean banking industry in a leading position among emerging economies. 
Nonetheless, a number of challenges will have to be faced in the coming years, 
including the expansion of banking and financial services to new segments of the 
population and the promotion of greater efficiency and competition in retail activities. 
 
Preparation for the transition to Basel II has coincided with a process of constant 
improvement of Chile’s regulatory and supervisory framework.  In recent years, 
important developments have taken place that include the update of the loan-
classification and provisioning system, the adoption of a risk-based supervisory model, 
the convergence of local accounting rules with international standards, and the 
                                                 
18  In Chile, banking regulation envisages the application of a system of solvency classification of 
institutions that uses the Basel I Capital Index as a benchmark. Institutions with capital indexes equal to 
or greater than 10% are classified in the top category of the supervisory rating applied by the SBIF.   
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establishment of new rules for market risks in line with the 1997 Market Risk 
Amendment.   
 
Although Chile has yet to complete its transition process, some preliminary policy 
lessons can be drawn from its experience and some of these may be helpful to other 
developing countries as they seek to address their own implementation challenges.  The 
main lessons can be summarized as follows: 
 
  Prior assessment of the existing state of regulation, supervision and risk 
management has proved a very useful exercise.  
 
  Serious shortcomings in the implementation of Basel I need to be resolved before 
moving on to Basel II.  
 
  Improvements to the loan-classification and provisioning system are highly 
recommendable.   
 
  The competitive and cost implications of the new framework need to be carefully 
assessed, mainly in the case of small banks. 
 
  Corporate governance and market discipline need to be strengthened.  
 
  Developing countries must be realistic and pragmatic when setting transition plans 
which means, for most of them, implementing the standardized approach first and 
moving on later (if at all) to the advanced approaches.  
 
  The use of external ratings poses some difficulties in emerging economies, but this 
does not preclude implementation of the standardized approach since this offers an 
alternative option when these ratings are not available or reliable. 
 
  Home/host communication and cooperation are essential for successful 
implementation but formal arrangements between supervisors, which involve costs 
for both sides, are only recommendable when foreign banks have a significant or 
systemic importance in the host market.  
 
  Since most work needs to be carried out by banks, it is crucial they are involved in 
the transition at an early stage. 
 
  Coordination with the Central Bank is important in countries where regulation and 
supervision are conducted by different institutions. 
 
  Legal amendments, if required, need thorough preparation and should only be 
undertaken after some knowledge and experience have been gained and interaction 
with the industry is well established. 
 
  Implementing Basel II is a major task for banking supervisors so they need to build 
all the required capacities.  This implies, among other measures, recruiting new 
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staff, the training of existing personnel and, in most cases, changing supervisory 
methods, procedures and culture. 
 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the current turmoil in credit and financial markets 
may provide an opportunity to assess some specific policy recommendations of Basel II 
and to draw new lessons concerning its implementation in both developed countries and 
emerging economies. 
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          Table 1: Financial Strength of the Chilean Banking System 
          (As of December of each year, unless otherwise stated) 
Year  ROE  Capital Ratio Past-Due Ratio Provisions/Total Loans
1997 13.7% - 0.97% 1.43%
1998 11.5% - 1.45% 1.91%
1999 9.40% 13.5% 1.67% 2.53%
2000 12.70% 13.2% 1.73% 2.51%
2001 17.70% 12.7% 1.62% 2.36%
2002 14.40% 14.0% 1.82% 2.33%
2003 16.70% 14.1% 1.63% 2.13%
2004 16.70% 13.5% 1.20% 1.99%
2005 17.85% 13.0% 0.91% 1.61%




1. For comparison purposes the ROE for June 2007 is annualized 






           Table 2: Portfolio Composition of the Chilean Banking System 
       (As of December of each year) 
2004  31.8%  67.2% 1.0% 12.7%
2005  32.8%  66.0% 1.2% 12.3%








Currency Loans Year 










    
       Table 3: Market Structure of the Chilean Banking System 
 
Figure 1: Capital Adequacy Ratio (%) 
1  
(Monthly, March 2000-June 2007) 
            
      (As of December of each year, unless otherwise stated) 
 
















1. Smoothed  using 12 m window.
2. This is the level required for a bank to be classified in the top category of the supervisory rating applied 
by the SBIF.  In addition, it is the minimum level required by the Comisión Clasificadora de Riesgo (CCR) for 
pension funds to be allowed to invest in shares issued by a bank. 
          
 
1997  29  20.2% 67.9% 12.0%
1998  29  24.8% 62.2% 13.0%
1999  29  41.7% 45.6% 12.8%
2000  29  45.2% 42.6% 12.2%
2001  27  45.1% 42.5% 12.3%
2002  26  42.8% 44.3% 12.9%
2003  26  40.4% 46.3% 13.4%
2004  27  39.5% 47.1% 13.4%
2005  26  38.8% 47.9% 13.3%
2006  26  38.6% 48.1% 13.3%
Jun-0
 
7 26  38.6% 48.1% 13.2%
Year   Foreign Banks Domestic Private Banks
    
State- Owned Banks
   
Number of
Share of Loan Market
 
Banks
Source: Author’s elaboration based on data from SBIF.
Source: SBIF. 
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Figure 2: Past-Due Ratio (%) 
(Monthly, January 2000-June 2007) 
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Figure 3: Lending in Foreign Currency as % of Total Lending 
(Monthly, January 2000-June 2007) 
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